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I

n “A Painful Lack of Wounds,” Dr. Christopher Bailey portrays an American veteran,
Colin, who slips into a “serious but not severe”
depression upon returning from the Iraq War. After ruling out post-traumatic stress disorder, the
psychiatrist comes to believe that Colin’s depression is tied to his feelings of being a wimp, of not
having “done his part or proven his manhood,”
and of losing his chance to become a hero because
he had been assigned non-combat duty—feelings
that the psychiatrist glosses (misleadingly?) as a
“painful lack of wounds.” (I speak of the “the psychiatrist,” rather than Dr. Bailey, in case some details of the case are constructed.) The psychiatrist
links Colin’s feelings of failure with insecurities
about his masculinity and about being able to defend himself and his family. Invoking evolutionary
psychology, the psychiatrist suggests to Colin that
his depression may be linked to how our culture
continually activates “visceral alarm systems” that
evolved on the African savannah, while providing
insufficient outlet for their expression—a dynamic
that might be especially damaging to the mental
health of white men like Colin and himself. In
response to Colin’s questions, the psychiatrist affirms the martial arts while emphasizing prudence
in expressing aggression.
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I have four sets of questions and comments.
First, does the psychotherapy succeed? We are
told Colin is receptive to undertaking a course
of talk therapy, but we are not told whether the
therapy lifts the depression and has additional
benefits. This information will color what we say
about the psychiatrist’s diagnosis and therapeutic
approach. If the therapy succeeds, we might applaud the psychiatrist for avoiding a knee-jerk
resort to pharmaceuticals, and laud his brilliance
in framing Colin’s suffering by invoking evolutionary psychology.
If the therapy fails, we might ask why psychotropic medication was not offered as an option, in
conjunction with the talk therapy. We might also
question whether the source of the depression has
been pinpointed. For example, was Colin’s shame
about his non-combat duty the crux of the matter,
or would a deeper examination reveal an underlying survivor guilt in watching friends die without
being put at personal risk? Or was the catalyst of
his depression simply the huge letdown in returning from exciting military service to the boredom
of civilian life, perhaps to a job that has little
challenge and a marriage that has lost its spark?
Was invoking the African savannah an unhelpful
digression? And was the psychiatrist counterproductively overidentifying with Colin as a white
American man enthusiastic about the military
arts, in need of more outlets for aggression, and
worrying about his family’s safety?
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Second, assuming the therapy succeeds,
why does it succeed? Is it because Colin’s brain
chemistry is altered, which can occur through
psychotherapy as well as pharmaceuticals? Or
is it because of attitudes Colin develops during therapy? More broadly, has the psychiatrist
spotlighted a neglected syndrome and helped us
understand how to understand and treat it? Does
research into the syndrome warrant funding (a
moral matter because the research might deflect
research funds from other worthy projects). Is
there any reason to think this is mainly a whitemale problem, or should we revisit Freud’s views
about society and human aggression in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930/1961), or instead
invoke a feminist analysis about socially instilled
ideals of masculinity?
Third, what is the role of truth in this very
practical activity of healing? I share the now
standard view that both brain chemistry and the
patient’s sense of meaning are important in healing depression. I also believe that both should be
wedded to the “common factors approach” to
understanding therapeutic efficacy pioneered by
Jerome and Julia Frank (1991, 40–44), among
others. The Franks ask how hundreds of different
therapies can be effective in dealing with depression and other ailments, at least for some patients.
They answer that healing turns on a combination
of generic factors such as an emotionally charged
extended relationship between a suffering client
and a caring therapist, a safe setting in which
the client can open up emotionally, some sort of
explanation (not necessarily true) of the client’s
symptoms, and some type of procedure that the
client and therapist think will help.
The common factors approach does not mean
that a search for truth is replaced by just any
subjectively meaningful encounter and perspective. But it does raise questions about the claims
of insight therapies to cure by identifying “the”
truth, as well as questions about how therapists
sometimes distort truth as part of the healing
process (Martin 2006, 163–166). Thus, evolutionary psychology might turn out to be irrelevant in
explaining Colin’s depression but still make a healing contribution when invoked by this particular
psychiatrist interacting with this particular veteran

(in contrast, say, with a pacifist counselor interacting with a biblical fundamentalist).
Fourth, and in conclusion, the case raises enduring issues about how far psychotherapy is and
should be value neutral (Sadler 2005; Tjeltveit
1999). One issue is the extent to which therapists should express their personal values during
therapy. If Colin’s therapy succeeds, we have a case
where the therapist’s active discussion of values,
in particular concerning male masculinity and the
martial arts, plays a positive role. If the therapy
fails, we have a case where the therapist’s insertion
of his values is inappropriate.
Another issue is how extensively psychotherapy
is an inherently moral enterprise in which a caring
and competent healer seeks to alleviate patients’
suffering and help clients to grapple with life’s
challenges. These questions about therapeutic
efficacy are not merely technical matters, but
instead have moral dimensions. In addition,
psychotherapy involves moral values in its procedures, such as respect for clients’ autonomy and
values, but also concern for third parties. With
regard to third parties, the psychiatrist expresses
worries that Colin’s preoccupation with proving
himself might in some situation “unwittingly put
himself and his family in harm’s way, if not hurt
someone who was never really a threat to begin
with.” This is good therapy: helping the patient
while keeping in mind the moral claims of family
and community—indeed, linking them.
Still another issue is the extent to which moral
values shape the very definition of mental disorders
and mental health. As a society, we have come to
define virtually all forms of suffering that disrupt
morally desirable functioning as pathological.
Conservative social critics are deeply alarmed
by this trend, and might even question whether
Colin’s depression is sufficiently severe to be a
psychiatric matter. Certainly there are grounds for
caution about how far we have gone in medicalizing depression, but I see wisdom in the trend,
assuming we appreciate how morality and mental
health are interwoven dimensions of both mental
disorders and strengths (Martin 1999, 2006).

Martin / Truth and Healing a Veteran’s Depression ■

References
Bailey, C. 2009. A painful lack of wounds. Philosophy,
Psychiatry, & Psychology 16, no. 3:223–224.
Frank, J. D., and J. B. Frank. 1991. Persuasion and
healing: A comparative study of psychotherapy.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Freud, S. 1930/1961. Civilization and it’s discontents,
trans. J. Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Martin, M. W. 1999. Depression: Illness, insight, and
identity. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 6,
no. 4:271–286.

231

Martin, M. W. 2006. From morality to mental health:
Virtue and vice in a therapeutic culture. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Sadler, J. Z. 2005. Values and psychiatric diagnosis.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Tjeltveit, A. C. 1999. Ethics and values in psychotherapy. New York: Routledge.

